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THE ECONOMIC JOURNAL 
DECEMBER, 1917. 
INDUSTRIAL UNREST1 
IN 1914, when the war broke out, a wave of patriotic senti- 
ment led the well-to-do citizens of this country to resolve to do 
something to prevent the poor from suffering too much. They 
proceeded to collect money for the relief of the distress which 
was expected from want of employment, and we can well 
remember the exultation felt when the aggregate reached a sum 
which would pay for about half a day of the war at the present- 
rate. The -expected unemployment did not arrive. Instead, em- 
ployment became more complete than ever before. The unem- 
ploymnent percentage curve sank almost to the base of the chart: 
old-age pensioners were dragged from their retirement; thousands 
of "flappers," girls in their early teens, left their trivial home 
tasks and peopled 3hanties run up for Government departments 
in St. James's Park and the Embankment Gardens, and hundreds 
of thousands worked in munition factories everywhere, while 
their brothers, the "flippers," got promotion at a rate which 
suggested that Father Time must have taken to an aeroplane. 
Wages in the new occupations were very high, and even in the 
depressed trades "war bonuses " had to be given to retain a much 
diminished number of workers. So far as money receipts were 
concerned, the working classes never had such a glorious time. 
And yet not quite three years after the beginning of the war 
1 Commission of Enquiry into Industrial Unrest, No. 1 Division, Report 
of the Commissioners for the North-Eastern Area, (Cd. 8662. Pp. 12. 2d.), 
No. 2, North-Western (Cd. 8663. Pp. 36. .4d.), No. 3, Yorkshire and East 
Midlands (Cd. 8664. Pp. 7. ld.), No. 4, West Midlands (Cd. 8665. Pp. 12. 
2d.), No. 5, London and South-Eastern (Cd. 8666. Pp. 7. ld.), No. 6, South- 
Western (Cd. 8667. Pp. 6. ld.), No. 7, WTales, including Monmouthshire (Cd. 
8668. Pp. 50. 6d.), No. 8, Scotland (Cd. 8669. Pp. 15. 2d.). 
No. 108.-VOL. XXVII. If H 
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a Commission was appointed by the Prime Minister to "inquire 
and report upon Industrial Unrest and to make recommendations 
to the Government at the earliest practicable date," and its work 
was considered so urgent that it divided itself into eight divisions 
(corresponding to the eight munition areas), and these eight all 
reported in a month! 
With the aid of the Commissioners' reports it is not verv 
difficult to see what the main causes of the unrest have been. 
In the first place we may take the loss of individual iberty. 
Of course, many of the restrictions imposed by war measures, 
while irritating enough to the people in general, can scarcely be 
regarded as causes of "industrial" unrest, inasmuch as they are 
not directly connected with employment. Such are the liquor 
restrictions, and the fact is probably the explanation of the 
sharp divergence of opinion between the various panels of the 
Commission when they ask themselves whether the liquor 
restrictions have been a cause of industrial unrest. The West 
Midlands Commissioners "were frankly amazed at the strength 
of the objections to the liquor restrictions," and recommend that 
the supply of beer should be largely increased. The Scotch Com- 
missioners, on the other hand, received no complaint from any 
quarter; and the North-Eastern Commissioners find that "the 
liquor restrictions have not generally led to the creationl of in- 
dustrial unrest"; while the North-Western Com-missioners very 
confusedly announce that they "are a cause of unrest," but "con- 
tribute to unrest rather than cause it," and quote with approval 
the observation of an employer, "I should not call the liquor 
restrictions a cause of unrest, but 1 should unhesitatingly say 
they are a source of a considerable loss of social temper." 
The Commissioners in general adopt the view very naively 
expressed in the North-Western report, that "the matter should 
be sensibly dealt with, not from- the high ideals of temperance 
reformers, whose schemes of betterment must be kept in their 
proper place till after the war, but from the human point of view 
of keeping the man who has to do war work in a good temper, 
which will enable him to make the necessary sacrifices in a con- 
tented spirit," beer being to many of the best citizens of the 
country "not only a beverage, but a sacred national institution." 
Conscription appears at first sight not to be a distinctively 
industrial matter, any more than the liquor restrictions, but it 
becomes so in conisequence of the necessary exceptions to its 
universality. The loss of liberty involved in every man of a 
certain age being compelled to serve was a popular loss among 
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almost all classes, because the man of miilitary age who was not 
willing to serve was disliked, but whether or not, it could not 
have been a cause of specifically industrial unrest. But when it 
was found that universality was impossible, and the loss of liberty 
took the form of tribunals deciding who was to go and who to 
stay, the situation was completely altered. Decisions that this 
man and that man, though of military age and fitness, shall be 
allowed to stay at home in safety because they are indispensable 
to the industry in which they are employed are and must be 
industrial decisions, and, human nature being what it is, they are 
absolutely certain to become a cause of industrial unrest. More- 
over, the Army itself, though its efforts are directed to the 
destruction of the enemy, is an industrial organisation, and offers 
great variety of occupation: the selection of men for the various 
occupations is entirely in the hands of the military authorities, 
and would be far from giving universal satisfaction, even if those 
authorities were perfectly wise. As things are, it is not surprising 
to hear from the Scotch Commissioners that "the whole system 
of the operation of the Military Acts is, in the opinion of the great 
bulk of the working classes, an exhibition of bungling inconi- 
petence and of exasperating dilatory methods," and that the 
opinion generally held of the unfair working of the Acts is "a 
great cause of unrest." 
While willing to submit to the loss of liberty involved in 
universal military service, the working classes to a man were 
strenuously opposed to "industrial conscription." Now it is true 
that no man has been industrially conscribed in the sense of being 
directly compelled to take some particular employment, but a 
great deal of what may be called negative industrial conscription 
has been introduced by restricting men's freedom to abandon 
their employment, either by way of strike or in order to take 
other employment. As the West Midlands Commissioners say, 
"The Munitions of War Acts have revolutionised industry. In 
normal times the workman is free to leave his employment, 
whether to secure better wages or on personal grounds; now he 
can do neither unless his employer consents or the Munitions 
Tribunal grants a certificate. . . . In normal times wage changes 
are settled by collective bargaining; now they are settled by the 
State. In normal times the employer disciplines his own men; 
now discipline is enforced publicly in a criminal court. Lastly, 
the Trade Unions have fought, rightly or wrongly, and in the 
engineering trades have fought successfully, for the principle that 
certain men or certain unions alone were entitled to certain work. 
H Ii 2 
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Now this has been swept away, and men and women of rival 
unions, or of nio unions at all, work alongside skilled craftsmen. 
These changes are strongly resented as infringements ofpersonal 
liberty, to which men are deeply attached." 
Historians tell us that the people of England in old times 
bought their liberties with hard cash. In our day surprise and 
annoyance has been expressed in some quarters at the unreadi- 
ness of the workmen to sell their industrial rights. Patriotism 
and pelf, they have been told, both demanded that they should 
make no fuss about such things: the one thing needful to them 
was to beat the Germans, and they should be thankful for the 
high wages which they were able to earn for doing it under, and 
it was implied, in consequence of, the new system. The appeal 
to patriotism has kept things going; the appeal to pelf has largely 
failed. 
One great reason for its failure has been, of course, the rise 
of prices, which has made the rise of wages to a large extent 
illusory and disappointing. The ordinary person's feelings are 
outraged by any change in prices which tells against him much 
more than they are gratified by a change in his favour. If his 
wages are doubled at the same time as the cost of the things he 
has been accustomed to buy rise one-half, he will not be thankful 
for the actual rise in his real wages, but will be infuriated by 
the belief that somebody has cheated him out of part of his 
rights. Thus even the large section of the working classes which 
has really so far without doubt benefited greatly by the war 
changes might quite reasonably have been expected to be ex- 
tremely discontented, as well as those whose position was left 
substantially unaltered and those who have been actually damaged. 
The eight panels of the Commission are unanimous in regarding 
the opinion of the working classes, that they have been exploited 
by the rise of food prices, as the universal and most important 
cause of industrial unrest. 
The other great reason for the failure of the rise of money 
wages to placate the wage-earners has been the fitfulness of its 
distribution. A community which would be quietly contented 
with a 10 per cent. rise of income all round and happier still if 
the same aggregate increase arrived in the shape of an equal 
instead of a proportionate addition to each person's income, is 
likely to be thrown into a seething ferment of discontent by a 
20 or a 50 per cent. rise distributed haphazard. The war changes 
have not only altered the distribution of earnings between different 
industries, but have altered the distribution between different- 
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classes of workers inside each industry at haphazard, so that 
individuals working in the samne shop have seen their relative 
positions reversed. The dispassionate outside observer sees no 
reason for supposing the new distribution to be less just or more 
unjust than the old, but the popular mind is devoted to the 
doctrine of vested interests and legitimate xpectations. If time 
out of mind one class of labour has earned 20 per cent. or there- 
abouts more than some other class, it will seem a cruel injustice 
to the first class if they get a rise of only 15 per cent. while the 
second gets a rise of 50 per cent., so that the new earnings are 
138 and 150 instead of 120 and 100. Nor will their dissatis- 
faction be anything like balanced by the satisfaction of the class 
which has risen : this satisfaction will be alloyed by an uneasy 
feeling that the good fortune is undeserved, and that the unlucky 
have been badly used. The West Midland Commissioners say: 
"The outbreak of the war found the craftsmen's unions, such 
as the A.S.E., working mostly on a time rate as against a piece 
rate. This was the ca-se even where a piece rate was applicable 
and would have paid the men better. This feature of Trade 
Union policy is so well known that we need not enlarge on it. 
The war caused changes which can be grouped under three 
heads: 
"First, the introduction of semi-skilled and unskilled men 
and women into work previously regarded as skilled men's work. 
"Second, the largely increased out-put of existing processes 
giving a greater earning power for the same piece rate, and 
"Third, the introduction of many new processes easily learnt 
and yielding a high wage at the agreed piece rates. To this must 
be added the great speeding-up which the beginning of the war 
called out, and the fact that it was very wisely determined that 
piece rates existing before the war should not be reduced. The 
result has been as great a revolution in industry as any similar 
period has witnessed. The output has been vastly increased, 
old processes have been scrapped, and new and more efficient 
ones introduced. Our industries tand on a different plane from 
the pre-war period. Now the effect of increased production 
coupled with a fixed piece rate has been a great increase of the 
earning power of workers doing repetition work. The rates were 
fixed in peace time, when not only were conditions more leisurely, 
but orders were received in dozens and grosses where they are 
now received in thousands and tens of thousands. Hence the 
machine can now be worked for a longer productive period, the 
output is enormously increased, and the wages earned have 
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reached a height hitherto undream-t of. In the engineering trade 
four pounds a week for [a] man or woman, who has entered the 
trade since the war, is not an unusual wage; whilst in many 
cases the wage reaches six, eiglht, and ten pounds a week or even 
more, all, be it understood, by workers with no previous experi- 
ence. At the same time the tool-maker and the- gauge-maker, 
both skilled men whose skill is the basis on which the machine 
operates, are still working on a pre-war rate, plus the bonuses 
and advances received since the war, but, taking all these into 
account, are receiving considerably less than the piece-worker. 
"The result may be imagined. The skilled man with a life's 
experience belhind him sees a girl or youth, whom perhaps he 
himself has taught, earning twice as much as he does. The 
injury to his self-respect is as great. as that to his pocket. His 
grievance is aggravated by the fact that the Leaving Certificate 
system prevents him from taking up repetition work himself." 
The Yorkshire and East MUidlands Commissioners similarly 
say: "In every district typical instances were given in which 
unskilled workers, labourers, women and girls, were earning mor6 
than double that of the skilled men, thus provoking discontent 
and acute unrest, not only in the ranks of the skilled men and 
in their homes concerning the inadequacy of their pay, but also in 
the other grades of ordinary unskilled labouir, where the earnings 
of the workers have been but slightly increased, and thus made a 
demand for higher rates of pay, such as would provide the bare 
necessities of living at the present exorbitant prices. 
" The methods followed in fixing the prices for the piece- 
workers appear to have been of a very haplhazard and careless 
character, arrived at generally without coniference with those 
who could have suggested more scientific and equitable methods 
of securing that the greatest output could h-ave been ensured by 
advancing skill and the employment of new and improved means 
of production. Unskilled workers in some factories are earning. 
from ?10 to ?18 per week, and could easily earn more but are 
afraid to." 
The discontent which exists takes the form of anger with the 
Government, not in the sense of the particular group of politicians 
who happen to form the Cabinet or the Ministry, but the whole 
machine. The Government is directly employing an astonishingly 
large proportion of the whole population, and a large proportion 
of the remainder are employed by firms which- are mere puppets 
in the hands of the Government. We hear no more of grand- 
motherly legislation: dropping that, the State has become the 
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Grand-enlployer, anld the employees do not like it in that capacity. 
The Commissioners for the North-Eastern and the South-Western 
divisions, indeed, do not seem to have been much impressed by 
the feeling against the Government, but the other six panels 
have no doubt of its strength and importance. The machine is 
regarded as slow, stupid, and untruistworthy in all the six divi- 
sions. The two of them whichl have the most independent life 
of their own-Scotland and Lancashire-think it too remote, and 
demand more local autonomy; but in the London area, within 
easy call of WXhitehall, there is but "a fading confidence in 
Government departments," and "a distinct opinion amongst both 
employers and workmen that the Government has intervened to 
a much greater extent than is desirable or useful in the relations 
between employers and employed"; in the West Midlands the 
distrust of Government "is both widespread and deep"; in the 
Yorkshire and East Midland division, not only the skilled en- 
gineering and electrical trades, but members of a dozen less 
skilled unions " all alike without a single exception expressed 
distrust in, and total indifference to, any promise the Government 
may make, while some referred to ' Russia,' and openly declared 
the olle course open for Labour was a general ' down tools ' policy 
to secure reforms that constitutional ction was failing to effect"; 
and the South Wales Commissioners ay "An outstanding 
feature of our inquiry has been the unqualified hostility on the 
part of witnesses, both on the men's and the employers' side, to 
Government interference. " 
There are many references throughout the report to the fact 
that the national trade unions are sharing in the loss of popularity 
suffered by the national government. This is due in part to the 
association of the union authorities with the Government in 
measures which have turned out badly, and partly to the greater 
appreciation, at a time of very rapid movement, of the slow and 
cumbrous lnature which characterises action through national unions 
as well as action through national government. Hence comes a 
preference for shop organisations in which the rank and file can 
act immediately when occasion arises. This looks like anarchy 
to the old-fashioned labour organiser, and many employers are 
beginning to look back with regret on a golden age when labour 
leaders were real gentlemen whom it was a pleasure to meet, and 
who possessed complete control over their followers. The Com- 
missioners are mostly puzzled by the development, which, after 
all, is probably only a step in the progress of individual iberty: 
the workers' position having become really less servile, action 
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by small sections in accordance with their immediate circum- 
stances has become possible, and the protection afforded by vast 
and cumbrous organisations is less universally nec-essary. 
The findings of the Commissioners on the causes of unrest 
seem more interesting, and likely to be more fruitful than their 
recommendations. The findings not only present a snapshot 
picture of the industrial conditions prevailing at the end of the 
third year of the war, which will be a cherished possession of the 
future historian, but also should greatly assist anyone whose 
business is the amelioration of those conditions. In recommenda- 
tions, however, it can scarcely be expected that Commissioners 
appointed and reporting in a month should be able to suggest 
anything which is important and valuable without being obvious. 
The Government of this country, like that of others, has made 
itself a very uncomfortable b d, but it has got to lie on it till the 
termination of the night, which, it is to be hoped, is not now 
far distant. By a little shifting here and there the uneasiness 
may be slightly alleviated, but- that is all. So we find a very large 
number of recommendations which differ in detail and relative 
emphasis between the eight reports, but which might be sum- 
marised in the advice, "remove causes of friction as far as possible 
and as quickly as possible by whatever means seem to be locally 
desirable, but do not imagine that you can do it by breaking 
pledges, even when they have led to great difficulties." 
But there is one exception to the general tameness of the 
recommendations. With regard to food prices, the eight panels 
are unanimous in thinking that something must be done. The 
Scotch Commissioners are cautious. They say that "on the whole 
amongst industrial workers there is no serious difficulty inmeeting 
the cost of living, at least among the workers engaged in the 
largest industries in Scotland. The experience of shopkeepers 
and co-operative societies, the reduction of cases in the Small 
Debt Courts, the savings banks returns, the reports of Poor 
Law authorities, etc., seem to indicate that, on the whole, the 
aggregate weekly incomes of industrial workers keep pace with 
the cost of living." They hint that much of the discontent in 
regard to the matter is fostered by misleading statements in the 
Press, and they only conclude that it must be "promptly dealt 
with, in the direction of either (a) taking steps to reduce the cost 
of the necessaries of life; or, if this is not possible, (b) convincing 
the public that the prevailing high prices are inevitable," without 
suggesting any method for securing either of these alternatives. 
'The West Midland Commissioners say "it is absolutely necessary 
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that the Government should take immediate steps to reduce 
prices and prevent profiteering. We shall no doubt be told that 
this is an easy thing to say but difficult to do. We are, however, 
not concerned to find a remedy, which is the business of the Food 
Controller, but we are concerned to point out that the present 
uncertainty and confusion are doing untold mischief, and that 
the question should be tackled at once in a resolute manner." 
The London Commissioners recommend a simple fixing of maxi- 
mum prices, and the North-Eastern and the Yorkshire Commis- 
sioners do the same, but add that Exchequer assistance must be 
given where necessary. The remaining three panels show a 
little more appreciation of the problem. The South Wales panel 
tried to find out "who and what causes are really responsible for 
the great increase in the cost of our food supplies," but found 
themselves "largely baffled" in their efforts, though they had 
to "exonerate" retailers, shipowners, and bakers. It was "sug- 
gested " to them, and they were "inclined provisionally to adopt 
the view, that the major part of the increased cost of food is due 
in part directly and in pa-rt indirectly to the destruction of tonnage 
by enemy submarines." To show the effect of this destruction 
they point out that 25 per cent. insurance on a ship worth 
?150,000 with a cargo insured at ?50,000, total ?200,000, is 
100 per cent. on the cargo. They think it wrong that the loss 
should fall upon the consumers of food, and that it ought, instead, 
to be "met and provided for in the same way as all expenditure 
directly incurred in prosecuting the war." That is, by an imme- 
diate increase of taxation or by an increase of borrowing with 
greater taxation to follow, but the panel's only suggestion for 
new taxation is that "all excess profits derivable from the sale 
and distribution of commodities for homne consumption should 
be appropriated by the State." They seem v,ry much pleased 
with this proposal to abolish "the incentive to charge inflated 
prices for such commodities," while leaving the merchant with 
a 20 per cent. of excess profits inducement o serve the foreigner 
rather than the home consumer. When he sells to the foreigner 
this panel, consisting of Messrs. Lleufer Thomas, Thomas Evans, 
and Vernon Hartshorn, who vaunt their absolute unanimity, take 
us clean back to the beginning of the seventeenth century by 
lauding his operations as " the bringing of wealth into this 
country." On page 36 they place the phrase "to bring wealth 
into the country " in inverted commas: the quotation might be 
originally from Mun's "England's Treasure by Forraign Trade," 
but the context suggests that it has been taken immediately from 
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some twentietlh century Cardiff shipowner. Other proposals of 
this panel are that the Government should "stamp out all pro- 
fiteering" in food, buy all imported food supplies as near as 
possible to the point of production, and fix the prices to be charged 
by the wholesaler, the middleman, and the retailer, while " in 
the event of its proving impracticable to bring abotut a substantial 
reduction in the cost of living, wages in all the lower-paid in- 
dustries " slhould "be increased proportionately to the increase in 
the cost of living." 
So far we can trace no recognition of what seems the very 
obvious fact that if there is less to eat somebody must eat less, 
and that the real problem is how to distribute the inevitable 
hlunger in the manner which will cause least suffering on the 
whole. The Commissioners insist on regarding high prices not 
as an incen-tive to greater production and importation and a dis- 
couragement to waste and lavish use, but as if prices were them- 
selves the root-cause of the trouble, and must be beaten down 
without hought of the effect of their suppression. If they cannot 
be so beaten down, the South Wales panel add, the lower-paid 
classes of the population must be given as much money as will 
enable them to buy as iuch of the commodities as thev used 
to buy, in spite of the shortage; that this (as Malthus showed in 
1801 in his panmphlet oni "The High Price of Provisions ") must 
cause a further enormous rise in prices, and, if the principle be 
followed out, a further and more extended application for increase 
of money wages followed by another rise of prices, and so on, 
ad infinitum, does not occur to this panel. 
The South-Western report, which bears the signatures 
William WV. Mackenzie, Alfred Booth, and T. Chambers, attri- 
butes the rise of prices to the inflation caused by the Government 
relying too nmuch on loans and "too little on taxation designed 
to check unnecessary consumption, and, latterly, to thle actual 
shortage of supplies." The only way to stop furtier inflation 
and the rise of prices resulting from it is to raise more by taxa- 
tion; the taxation thought of seems to be increase of income tax 
and super tax. To get rid of the shortage, losses by submarine 
must be diminished and mnore ships built. The report continues ;
"Inflation and real shortage inevitably produce conditions 
favoura-ble to what is commonly called profiteering, which is 
really only a symptom of the disease from which we are suffering. 
Treatment of the symptom may produce some alleviation, but 
cannot effect a cure. The danger of fixing prices for any com- 
modity is, of course, that the supply may cease. The general 
This content downloaded from 128.235.251.160 on Wed, 10 Dec 2014 07:09:24 AM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
1917] INDUSTRIAL UNREST 463 
rule, therefore, should be not to fix prices unless the whole supply 
is controlled. When this can be done the control should extend 
from the field of production to the shop-counter, and intermediate 
charges should be limited to a fair remuneration for service.s 
rendered." 
This gets nearer the kernel than the other reports. It recog- 
nises that the high prices are partly caused by people having 
more money to lay out (owing to the inflation), and partly by 
there being a less quantity of commodities available for sale, and 
also that the hiigh prices encourage supply. But it does not 
squarely face the fact that the inflation portion of the rise in the 
price of the more necessary articles comes particularly from the 
increased money means of the working classes; an increase of 
money means in the hands of the wealthy does not lead to any 
appreciable increase in the demand for and price of the "neces- 
saries of life "-it leads almost exclusively to increase in the 
demand for and price of luxuries and of articles in which the 
money of the saving rich is "invested," or "capital goods," as 
they are sometimes called. Consequently the South-Western 
Commissioners rather weaken their case for more taxation when 
they suggest increase of income tax and super tax, coupled with 
greater allowances for families, which is presumably what is meant 
by "a comprehensive reform with regard to the treatment of 
family incomes "; it is not taxation of those with the largest, but 
those with the smallest, margins over absolutely necessary ex- 
penditure which will most tend to reduce the prices of necessaries. 
Further, while observing that price calls forth supply, the report 
fails altogether to notice that it alsg arranges for the distribution 
of the commodity priced. When a commodity is sold for what 
it will fetch, eacll of a number of persons buys as much of it 
as he wants at that price, and there is ellough to go round; when 
it is sold compulsorily for something belowv that price, people 
want (at the nlew Government price) miiore than there is, and there 
is no longer enough to go round, in the sense of each person 
getting as much as he asks for. Even the populace is beginning 
to say: "It's a queer thing that whenever the Controller fixes 
the price of anything you don't seem able to get it." It is not 
that everybody does not get it, but that some do not. Those who 
get it are those who arrive first o take their places in the queue, 
those who are most in favour with the seller because they buy 
plenty of other things, those who make no complaint of quality, 
and so on. The distribuLtion resulting from the ordinary working 
of unrestricted prices is ulndoubtedly bad in enabling the rich to 
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buy more tlhanl the poor with equal wants, btut it is good in 
enabling persons of equal means to obtain the unequal quantities 
required to give equal satisfaction to their unequal wants. Those 
who wish to do away with it, therefore, should first devise some- 
thing better to take its place. 
The North-Western Commissioners alone among the eight 
panels have grasped this truth. They have not got it from the 
elementary economic text-books, but from the hard teaching of 
experience furnished especially by the Government reatment of 
sugar, about which they quote with evident approval the opinion 
of witnesses that the real value of the experiment is as "an 
example of how not to do it." I-having complete control over 
the distribution of sugar, and having less to divide than the people 
had been accustomed to, what did the Government do? It might, 
of course, have sold the diminished quantity for what it would 
fetch. A very large sum of money would have been raised by this 
course, and that would have reduced the necessity of borrowing. 
Complaints of profiteering would have been less, because, while 
they could not have been made with regard to sugar, the increase 
in the amount of the money means of the people absorbed by the 
purchase of sugar would have diminished the amount of money 
they could offer for other things, and thereby tended to keep prices 
down. So far as people of equal means are concerned, the dis- 
tribution would have remained just as good as in ordinary times, 
the higher price simply tending to cut off waste and the least 
necessary consumption. So far as rich (with whom for this 
purpose must be lumped their indoor servants) and poor are con- 
cerned, there is at any rate very little reason for assuming that 
the distribution would have been materially worse than in 
ordinary times. Some wealthy persons no doubt would have gone 
on buying as much as before, thus leaving a smaller proportion 
of the diminished quantity to the rest of the people. But where 
is the evidence that this alteration would have been of any appre- 
ciable magnitude? It is too often forgotten that while it is 
easier for the rich to continue to buy their accustomed quantity 
of a commodity which has become more expensive than it is for 
the poor, it is also easier for them to reduce their consumption 
than it is for the poor. Results will be different in the case of 
different commodities; so far as sugar is concerned, ft seems highly 
probable that the reduction of consumption owing to the pressure 
of high price, coupled, as it would have been, with appeals to 
patriotism, would have beeni somewhat greater among the people 
of more than the average income taken as a whole than among 
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those below that level, so that the poor would lhave had a larger 
proportion. 
The Government did not take that line, nor does it occur to 
the North-Western Commissioners as a possibility. The plan 
adopted was to hand out the sugar, at a price much below what 
it wouild have fetched, to grocers in the proportions in which the 
total was divided just before the war, and to insist on their selling 
it at retail prices corresponding to the wholesale prices charged 
by the Government. It is characteristic of the British Govern- 
ment to forget the possibility of change, and to ignore it when 
it actually occurs. The distribution was already out of date when 
it came into force, and, of course, became rapidly more and more 
so. In the great changes caused by the war there was much 
shifting of population; the areas with an increase, which were 
predominantly areas producing urgently required munitions, were 
obviously much worse served with sugar than the areas which 
had been denuded of a large portion of their population. But this 
was not the only worsening of distribution. The Government 
had indeed ordered the grocers to sell at prices far below what 
the sugar would fetch, but it had given them no guidance on the 
question to whom to sell and in what proportions. Officials and 
politicians might believe in the rule of " as in 1913 " being applied 
to 1915 and later years, but grocers are more in touch with life, 
and were not likely to suppose that they could deal out sugar 
on that principle to a population undergoing a shifting unexampled 
in modern history. The ordinary grocer could not put his cus- 
tomers on equal rations for two reasons. In the first place, he 
had generally no knowledge and no effective means for acquiring 
knowledge of the exact number of his customers and their house- 
holds. Secondly, even if he had that knowledge, he could not 
enforce equal rations unless he refused all new customers: a 
grocer who, himself rationed "as in 1913" by the Government, 
gave equal amounts to all customers would be compelled to reduce 
the ration every day as the news spread and his customers daily 
increased in number. The co-operators, who are a slightly more 
exclusive body than the customers of an ordinary grocer, seem 
to have tried this plan, and to have had a great increase in mem- 
bership, with the result that their equal ration has apparently 
fallen below the per capita amount available for the whole popula- 
tion. It is easy to go to a new grocer, and not very difficult to 
join a co-operative society, while continuing to buy from your 
original grocer. 
The course actually adopted by the grocers was the best open 
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to them in the circumstances, both in their own interest anid in 
that of the public. Being compelled to beconle the agents of the 
Government in giving away sugar for less than it would fetch, 
they "gave it away with a pound of tea," sometimes in the literal 
sense of that expression, but more often simply by being accom- 
modating or otherwise, according as the would-be purchaser of 
sugar was in respect of other thinigs a customer whom it was 
desirable to placate. That this was the best plan in the interest 
of the grocer is obvious. Debarred by law from charging more 
than the fixed price for sugar, he yet succeeded in enlarging his 
profits as a whole by using the Government gift (provided at the 
expense of the taxpayers) in such a way as to make him able 
to deal on more favourable terms with his customers in respect 
of other goods, and he was only partially deprived of these in- 
creased gains by the excess profits tax. To the public the plan 
was, of course, less satisfactory. The North-Western Commis- 
sioners are right in condemning it. They might well have pointed 
out, not only that it was bad, but that it was much worse than 
the ordinary practice of selling sugar for what it will fetch. The 
consumers as a whole, taking indirect payments into account, 
paid just as much m-oney for their sugar as they would liave done 
under unrestricted prices, and, in additioni, endured a large amount 
of inconvenience and annoyance, while the distribution of the 
burden of the shortage was considerably worse than it would have 
been under restricted prices. The wealthy had just as much 
advantage as usual, for, ceteris paribus, the wealthy purchaser 
is the one whom the retailer finds it pay best to placate. The 
pushing and unscrupulous of all ranks, with their greater readi- 
ness to exaggerate their claims and put pressure on their grocer 
or grocers, were given an unusual advantage. All this was, of 
course, on the top of the inequality of local distribution arising 
from the Procrustean pre-war standard. 
But, in the circumstances, could the grocers have served the 
public better? The popular idea seems to have been that every 
grocer should have sold to any purchaser whatever amount of 
sugar that purchaser chose to proffer the Government price for, 
and occasionally some simple-minded individual called a police- 
man to his assistance, and demanded that he should compel the 
shopkeeper to hand over the required sugar. There was a resolute 
determination ot to face the fact that at the Government price 
the sugar would not go round, so that the adoption of the prin- 
ciple that the grocer must sell meant the adoption of the queue 
system of distribution, under which first-comers get as much 
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as they ask for and late-coniiers get none at all, except by begging 
or buying from the more fortunate first-comers. The Devonport 
administration did not see much, but it did see this, and there- 
fore refused to yield to the popular clamour in favour of com- 
pulsory sale. It was, however, quite unable to suggest any better 
plan to the grocers than that whichi they had adopted, and this 
inability was shared by all its critics without exception. The 
grocers had in fact restored the rule of market price as nearly as 
they could uinder the regulations, and it was the best they 
could do. 
The Government scheme for sugar was no doubt adopted not 
to secure ani improved distribution of sugar, but an improved 
public temper. In this, as everyone knows, it failed egregiously. 
The North-W\Vestern Commissioners conclude their indictment of 
it with the words: "If during the coming winter other necessaries 
of life are controlled and distributed in a like manner the position 
would, in our opinion, become very dangerous." 
They proceed to propose the scheme for improved regulations 
which has since become familiar owing to its adoption by the 
Government. Under it the housewife will nio longer be able to 
run from grocer to grocer buying half-a-pound here and half-a- 
pound there along with other things. She is to be tied to a 
single grocer (individual or co-operative society) for sugar; on 
the other hand, the grocer chosen nlust give her the quantity to 
which the number of persons she is registered as buying for 
entitles her to claim. Under this system the gift intended to 
be made by the taxpayers to the sugar consumers will no longer 
be intercepted by the grocers and partially restored to the tax- 
payers by the excess profits tax. It will really reach the sugar 
consumers, and the taxpayers will recover nothing, but have to 
pay the considerable cost of administering the somewhat indis- 
criminate charity. 
Whether the new plan is a good or a bad one is of enormous 
importance, if the war continues, because the North-Western 
Commissioners regard it as applicable not only to sugar, but to 
all necessaries of life, and certain details in the sugar registra- 
tion forms certainly suggest that Government contemplates the 
possibility of using the sugar registration for other commodities. 
We may well doubt whether the confidence of the North-Western 
Commissioners i not somewhat blind. 
In the first place, it seems that they rate too low the diffi- 
culties arising from the elasticity of households. Already (in 
September, 1917) some of these are beginning to be realised by 
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the lhousewife who thinks of her guests and her day-girl, and, 
on the other hand, of meals takeni outside the home by her husband 
or her sons and daughters, and we begin to wonder whether the 
plan is really better than the much more exact German ticket 
system. Later on it will probably be discovered that the actual 
elasticity of households has led to much overlapping and conse- 
quent double-reckoning of individuals. What statistician would 
trust a census in which the householder was promised half-a-pound 
of sugar per week at a low price for every person he entered on 
his schedule? The "British Sugar Census of 1917" is likely to 
find a place in future manuals of statistics as an example of 
inaccuracy induced by bias. Moreover, the longer the register 
remains in force the worse it will get. Arrivals and births (or 
is it to be weanings?) are sure to find their way into the register, 
while deaths and departures will be less promptly and completely 
recorded. Thus the rule of equal division will be subject to a 
good many and very undesirable xceptions. 
Secondly, neither the North-Western Commissioners nor any- 
one else seem to have made any study of the question whether 
equality of division applied for the duration of the war to the 
distribution of a few of the necessaries of life, each being taken 
separately, will really be a better distribution than the distribu- 
tion which results from free purchases at unrestricted prices. 
It is an economic commonplace that greater equality in the dis- 
tribution of income is desirable, but that is only because greater 
equality of income would mean a nearer approach to distribution 
according to needs, which is the true principle. Further, accept- 
ance of the commonplace does not imply acceptance of the pro- 
position that complete equality introduced suddenly and enforced 
for a limited period only is desirable. 
The proportions in which families of equal means need the 
different "necessaries of life " are very different. In ordinary 
times they distribute their expenditure among the different eces- 
saries in the way which seems best, some getting more bread, 
some more meat or milk, and so on. By equal rationing all this 
variety is done away with; each household is given the same 
amount per head of each commodity; allowances for age, sex, 
occupation, and other things can only be introduced with diffi- 
culty. An immense disorder is thus introduced into household 
economy, and, unless the aggregate to be divided is enormously 
smaller than usual, much waste is likely to occur, as everyone 
with any experience of fairly liberal equal rations knows. This 
admittedly bad result is supposed to be more than counterbalanced 
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by the improvement in the distribution between families of very 
unequal means, between "rich and poor,"as it is commonly put 
in popular phraseology by those who think that because the rich 
are conspicuous and their habitations occupy a good deal of the 
area of cities they must consume a very large proportion of the 
necessaries of life, so that it will be an important alleviation of 
the suffering of their poorer fellow-citizens if such part of their 
consumption of necessaries as is over and above the average 
consumption is cut off from them and divided among those who 
have less than the average. But this belief is unfounded; whether 
we include indoor servants with the "rich" or not, their excess 
consumption of most of the necessaries which can be weighed 
out in equal rations is insufficient in the aggregate to make any 
important difference to the very much more numerous "poor."Ps 
Of some necessary commodities, notably bread, the per capita 
consumption of the rich is actually less than that of the poor, 
and the cynical observer is tempted to suggest that perhaps this 
is the reason why bread is usually the first thing to which the 
rule of equal rations is applied-the poor lose by it ! There is 
certainly one great example of a necessary of which the excess 
consumption by the rich forms an important aggregate, namely, 
fuel. But it is a striking fact that here the undesirability 
of introducing equal distribution suddenly and for a limited period 
has been sufficiently obvious to induce the British Government 
in rationing London for coal to adopt the principle not of equal 
division per head, but of division according to number of rooms 
occupied, which, of course, varies with means as well as with 
numbers of persons in the household. 
While compulsory rationing on any principle is probably 
inferior to the voluntary rationing enforced by rise of price, we 
need have little doubt that the sugar scheme sketched by the 
North-Western Commissioners and adopted by the Government 
is a better one than the Rhondda plan of lowering the prices 
of bread and meat, while leaving the restriction of consumption 
to the War Savings Committee's exhortations and trusting the 
distribution of the bread and meat to chance. The bakers and 
the butchers, not selling such a multitude of things as the grocers, 
are not in a position to put a check on the demand for bread and 
meat of the kind imposed by the grocers in the case of sugar under 
the Devonport r?gime, and at present (September) it remains to 
be seen whether they can devise some other check. If not, we 
may expect to see bread and meat added to the sugar scheme, 
the difficulties of which will be thereby much intensified. 
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Possibly the sugar scheme may do good by forcing people to 
accept the truth of the proposition that you cannot fill eiglht 
pint pots out of a can which holds less than a gallon. Even if 
there are a considerable number of deadheads on the register, it 
will still be very obviously true that the ration will depend on 
the total to be divided and the number, including deadheads, 
among whom it is to be divided. At preselnt here is a continual 
mixing up of deficiencies arising from unequal distribution with 
deficiencies arising from the smallness of the total. Even the 
Commissioners sonmetimes fall into this confusion. The North- 
Eastern panel want staple commodities to be "procurable" at 
fixed prices, which is clearly just what they cannot be, if, as is 
of course implied, the fixed prices are below the prices which will 
just make the commodity go round. The North-Western panel 
say that "the Wholesale Co-operative Society, which deals in one 
year with 174,000 tons of sugar to the value of ?6,000,000, has 
not received sufficient rations to distribute to its working-class 
members and their dependents, who number over 12,000,000." 
The charitable reader will tak-e "sufficient rations " here to mean 
the amount which the Wholesale ought to have received, havilng 
regard to the quantity to be divided, so that the rest of the people 
must have had more than they ought. But, no, the report goes 
on: " Unorganised consumers have been even worse off, because 
they have been left to look after themselves." 
EDWIN CANNAN 
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